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AbstrAct
Time banks (TBs) have experienced significant growth in 
the last few years in Spain and have been incorporated 
in the agenda of political parties drawing the attention 
of national and international media as a solution to the 
economic crisis. Nevertheless, there is scant empirical 
evidence about this phenomenon in Spain. After 
describing the role of TBs in other countries, this paper 
examines the structure and management of TBs in 
Spain and develops a taxonomy of them. Additionally, 
it identifies the goals TBs pursue and the reasons why 
users join them. To do so, this paper uses a mixed-
method approach consisting of in-depth interviews with 
28 TB managers and an online survey of users (n=270). 
It concludes that TBs are a social-political project rather 
than a utilitarian-economic project, identifying differences 
between Spanish TBs and those in other countries.
Keywords 
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resumen
Los bancos de tiempo han ido ganando importancia en 
los últimos años, han sido incorporados en programas 
políticos, y están siendo objeto de atención por la prensa 
nacional e internacional como una solución a la crisis 
que atraviesa el país. Sin embargo, poco se sabe de 
este fenómeno en España. Este trabajo, tras identificar 
el papel que los bancos de tiempo han jugado en otros 
países, analiza tanto la estructura y gestión de los bancos, 
ofreciendo una taxonomía de los mismos, además de 
examinar los fines para los que se crean y por los que 
se participa en ellos. Para ello, se recurre a un método 
mixto: entrevistas en profundidad con 28 gestores de 
bancos de tiempo y una encuesta online a usuarios 
(n=270). Se concluye que el fenómeno de los bancos 
de tiempo en España tiene más de proyecto social-
político que económico-utilitario y que mantiene algunas 
particularidades que lo diferencian de otros países.
PAlAbrAs clAve
Bancos de tiempo; España; mercados alternativos; método 
mixto; perfil.
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IntroductIon
In the last few years, different complementary curren-
cy systems have emerged (Seyfang and Longhurst 
2013a; Blanc 2011; Hughes 2005), such as lo-
cal currencies, barter markets and time banks (TB 
hereafter). In his typology of complementary curren-
cies, Blanc (2011: 9) describes TBs as schemes that 
pursue a community purpose and principally aim to 
contribute to the “well-being, empowerment, auton-
omy and social exchanges of a given community”. 
As such, the main difference with other community 
currencies is that TBs are seen as social innova-
tion because they address specific social needs and 
enhance social aspects of well-being (Seyfang and 
Longhurst 2013a, b; Blanc 2011; Seyfang 2004).
The functioning of TBs is simple: users provide ser-
vices to other users thus earning time credits that may 
be used later to obtain a service that they need (Clary 
2008); in turn, the recipient has a debt in time credits 
and ‘repays’ by providing a service to the same or a dif-
ferent member of the TB. In this way, time is ‘banked’ 
and may be used when the member needs it. Thus, 
reciprocity is indirect and multilateral in TBs and ex-
changes are not dyadic, but chain-generalised (Ekeh 
1974) or network-generalized (Yamagishi and Cook 
1993). These exchanges include a variety of services 
such as cooking, babysitting and dog walking, among 
others (Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 2012; Ozanne 
and Ozanne 2011; Seyfang 2006). In TBs, time is un-
derstood as an alternative type of currency operating 
as a store of value and a medium of exchange (Boyle 
2014). Because time banking is based on tenets of 
equality, all services are usually equally valued regard-
less of the service provided, that is, an hour’s work 
for an hour’s work (Seyfang and Longhurst 2013b; 
Dittmer 2013; Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 2012; 
Ozanne and Ozanne 2011). However, this also means 
that exchanges are often limited to services, since it is 
complicated to define goods’ value in time and trade 
them in TBs (Dittmer 2013; North 2003).
TBs have been limitedly examined in the literature, 
especially compared to other forms of community cur-
rencies (Dittmer 2013) and to our knowledge there is no 
paper addressing the phenomenon in Spain. Yet, the 
number of TBs in Spain has grown considerably over 
the past years until reaching 200 in 2012 (Del Moral 
2013) or, according to other sources, 250 (Seyfang 
and Longhurst 2013a) or 328 (Vivir Sin Empleo 2014). 
The three main political Spanish parties, the Spanish 
Socialist Worker Party (PSOE), the People’s Party 
(PP) and the United Left (IU) included the commit-
ment to create TBs in their political agenda, albeit with 
different aims–youth development, the work-life bal-
ance and alternative economy development, respec-
tively (Del Moral 2013). Spanish TBs have appeared 
frequently in the national and international media in 
the last two years, where they are presented as an 
alternative economy in times of recession that allows 
the unemployed to counteract the negative effects of 
the crisis (Del Moral 2013; see, inter alia, stories by 
Eunjung Cha 2012 and Frayer 2012). 
Two main streams of research on TBs can be 
identified. A first group of authors have developed 
conceptual papers about TBs exploring their poten-
tial in a transition to sustainability and the degrowth 
paradigm (e.g., Dittmer 2013; Seyfang 2006; Hughes 
2005). A second group of authors have studied spe-
cific TBs, usually one at a time (with the exceptions 
of Seyfang and Smith 2002 and Collom, Lasker and 
Kyriakou 2012). Most research has been conducted 
in English-speaking countries. In the United States, 
Collom (2007; 2008; 2011) analyzed participants’ 
motivations and benefits, TBs’ ability to create so-
cial capital, and the results obtained as a tool of in-
clusion for the elderly. Dubois, Schor and Carfagna 
(2014) examined the transformatory potential of TBs 
focusing on the Boston Trade Circle TB. In the UK, 
Seyfang (2002; 2003) examined TBs as a tool for so-
cial inclusion. In New Zealand, Ozanne (2010) and 
Ozanne and Ozanne (2011) studied how TBs helped 
to strengthen community ties and the types of capital 
created. Finally, Molnar (2011) evaluated the achieve-
ments and challenges of a TB in Sweden. All these 
authors describe the aims of TBs in these countries, 
their organisation and management, and users’ ex-
perience. TBs are said to be chameleonic given that 
they are instrumental for different purposes in differ-
ent countries (Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 2012). 
Consequently, they are also organized differently in 
different countries (Seyfang and Longhurst 2013a). 
This paper reviews the existing literature to de-
scribe the role TBs play in other countries as well as 
their organisation, drivers and barriers for participa-
tion. The results of our empirical study comprising 
interviews with time brokers of 27 Spanish TBs and 
of an online survey of Spanish TBs users are then 
presented. A comparison of Spanish TBs with those 
of other countries is provided in order to assess simi-
larities and differences.
Such research is timely in the Spanish context be-
cause as said above, they have been featured in the 
media, been included in political agendas, and grown 
in number. Furthermore, we have examined different 
types of TBs, some of which have emerged from the 
recent 15M movement. The narratives of TB manag-
ers show that they expect important outcomes from 
the creation of a TB. Yet our findings provide evidence 
that the number of exchanges is very limited and that 
most participants have never carried out a transac-
tion. The main conclusion of this research is that TBs 
in Spain enjoy more symbolic than material impor-
tance, corroborating Dittmer’s (2013) claims for TBs’ 
limited potential. This paper will ultimately suggest 
possible explanations for this contradiction. Given the 
state of the literature, this paper should be considered 
exploratory. The findings indicate research lines that 
should be addressed in future studies. 
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the Phenomenon of tIme bAnKs Around the 
world: orIgIns, PurPose And functIonIng
TBs were created in the US in the 1980s by the civil 
rights lawyer Edgar Cahn in response to the erosion 
of informal neighborhood networks (Seyfang 2002). 
Cahn’s main purpose was to “make social welfare 
more effective and humane” through what he called 
“co-production” (Dittmer 2013: 6). His ideas served as 
basis for the global expansion of the phenomenon, al-
though they first appeared in Japan (Gregory 2012).
Cahn’s basic principles (in Seyfang 2006: 6) for 
TB functioning are: “recognising people as assets 
and that everyone has skills to share; redefining work 
to include the unpaid ‘core economy’ of work in the 
neighborhood and community; nurturing reciprocity 
and exchange rather than dependency; growing so-
cial capital; encouraging learning and skills-sharing; 
involving people in decision making”. However, they 
vary in terms of their origins, functioning and purpose.
Boyle (2014) identified different streams of TBs 
around the world that either emerge from comple-
mentary currency initiatives (e.g., German) or from 
reciprocal volunteering systems (e.g., the UK, Japan 
and the US). This origin influences the expectations or 
goals attributed to time banking. We can differentiate 
three main purposes: social, political, and economic.
In the US and the UK, TBs have been tradition-
ally promoted among the unemployed and other so-
cially excluded groups (e.g., the elderly and the dis-
abled) as a means to foster inclusion and equality 
(Del Moral 2013; Collom 2008; Kimmel 2008). Also, 
in Japan (Boyle 2014) TBs or Fureai Kippu date back 
to the 1970s and were linked principally to the partici-
pation and support of the elderly and retired (Boyle 
2014; Hayashi 2012; Miller 2008).
Research suggests that they have targeted so-
cially excluded and marginalized groups (Seyfang 
2006b; Seyfang 2004; Seyfang and Smith 2002). In 
a similar line, the Accorderie model1 of time banking, 
developed in Quebec and then expanded in France, 
aimed at fighting social exclusion and poverty (Fare 
2012). In the US, many TBs were created to facili-
tate access to services among the elderly in order 
to increase their well-being (Seyfang and Pearson 
2000). In the UK, Seyfang (2002) depicts TBs as 
part of the social economy and as an improvement 
over volunteering, since they have attracted socially 
excluded groups more successfully than traditional 
volunteering. Research shows that TBs may improve 
employability by acquiring new skills at no cost, build 
1  The Accorderie model is described as a community cur-
rency where all members have time accounts; no physical bills 
are exchanged (Fare 2012). When an exchange is carried out, 
one of the parties is debited with time and the other one is 
credited following the ‘one hour equals one hour’ principle, 
similarly to TBs in other countries. However, its main difference 
from TBs is that they also have a community credit program 
and a collective purchasing association.
members’ self-confidence and self-worth by putting 
in use their skills set and foster empowerment among 
members (Molnar 2011; Seyfang 2003). 
Yet the possible social objectives of TBs are not 
limited to social inclusion. In Spain and Italy a large 
number of TBs emerged out of the feminist movement 
as municipal TBs (Boyle 2014; Del Moral 2013; Blanc 
and Fare 2013; Amorevole, Colombo and Grisendi 
1998) to foster the work-life balance (Gisbert 2010). 
Their purpose largely focused on creating social 
capital and mutual assistance among older people 
(Blanc and Fare 2013; Miller 2008). In New Zealand 
they were fostered as a tool to strengthen ties among 
neighbors (Ozanne 2010; Ozanne and Ozanne 2011). 
Research on TBs in Sweden and UK concludes that 
they have proven successful as a tool to create social 
capital (Collom 2008; 2007; Molnar 2011).
In addition, time banking is presented as a politi-
cal project. Cahn (2001) contended that time bank-
ing would promote co-production, recognising that 
everybody has skills to offer to the community espe-
cially when related to social and community services 
such as health and education. Time banking tried to 
fill one of the problems created by the current neo-
liberal model: the erosion of the Economy of Care, 
the impossibility of reaching full employment and the 
lack of social and political recognition of unpaid jobs 
(Gregory 2012; Kimmel 2008). Time banking chal-
lenges the system by promoting an entirely different 
set of principles than those found in the neoliberal 
paradigm (Seyfang 2006). For example, the principle 
of egalitarian remuneration is thought as a critique 
to how value and time are priced in the neoliberal 
capitalist market.
Therefore, as several authors advocate (Collom 
2008; Seyfang 2006; Seyfang and Pearson 2000), 
TBs also hold political importance: they are a glimpse 
into an economy based on ethical values (Kimmel 
2008). It is not surprising that they have been linked 
to the global justice movements (Del Moral 2013; 
Collom 2008) and have been traditionally seen as a 
form of disengagement from the market and of resis-
tance to global capitalism. However, Hughes (2005) 
argued that these alternative trading spaces should 
be understood as reformist rather than radical build-
ing on previous work by Lee et al. (2004). Likewise, 
Dittmer (2013: 7) offers a more critical view of the 
potential of TBs as a tool in degrowth economies, as 
he contends that they are not well suited to advance 
alternative livelihoods or eco-localisation. At most, 
they can help strengthen ties in the community, and 
at worse, they may be a “cover for the neoliberal dis-
mantling of the welfare state” or even contribute to 
the commodification of personal relations.
Finally, regarding the economic project, TBs are 
often depicted as a way of having access to services 
that users otherwise cannot afford (Collom, Lasker 
and Kyriakou 2012; Seyfang 2003). Also, as previ-
ously mentioned, recently the press has often con-
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veyed the idea of time banking as an alternative 
market for those hit by the recession. Boyle (2014) 
argued that in Italy and Austria, TBs attract those 
better-off but still hit by the crisis. On a different note, 
Del Moral (2013) explained that TB users may suffer 
from time poverty and look to cover real needs that 
emerge from their busy schedules (e.g., babysitting 
for working mothers). Yet although participants may 
be attracted by the possibility of obtaining material 
gains, different authors argue that TBs are ill-suited 
for this goal, given that there is no trade of goods 
and the limited availability of services (Dittmer 2013; 
Seyfang 2006; Lee et al. 2004). As Dittmer (2013: 9) 
suggested, TBs “do not support autonomy from for-
mal employment” for their users, as for example a 
LETS may partially do.
Studies of TB members have also suggested this 
potential threefold role of TBs. The three main mo-
tives for joining a TB are political or ideological (e.g., 
fighting the current economic paradigm), economic 
(e.g., receiving services that they could not otherwise 
afford) and social (e.g., helping others and improv-
ing the neighborhood) (Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 
2012; Collom 2008; 2007; Seyfang 2002).
The profile of participants may largely define the 
purpose, level and type of activity of the TB, because 
of the skills they bring and because of their mo-
tives and preferences (Dubois, Schor and Carfagna 
2014). For example, in Miller’s thesis on Japanese 
TBs, it is argued that (2008, p.208): “the relative af-
fluence of the aged in Japan, where retirees hold the 
greater share of private wealth, may mean that older 
Japanese draw more on time banks as a source of 
friends and pursuits to fill their time than as an alter-
native form of funding for help in any future depen-
dency situation”. Similarly, in other studies carried 
out in relatively affluent neighborhoods such as the 
first TB in New Zealand (Ozanne 2010), the Italian 
TB of Modena (Del Moral, 2013) or the Boston Time 
Trade Circle (Dubois, Schor and Carfagna 2014), the 
focus of the TB was not so much on co-production, 
but on strengthening the community and neighbors’ 
relations.
Although TBs usually operate according to the 
same basic principles, there are differences in their 
organization and management. Molnar (2011) differ-
entiates between person-to-person, person-to-agen-
cy, and agency-to-agency models. In most countries, 
the person-to-person model is the most frequent, but 
in the US, the UK and Sweden the person-to-agency 
model also exists (Collom 2007), coherent with the 
purpose of improving the efficacy of social welfare 
(Ozanne 2010). These agency-based TBs are similar 
to what Boyle (2014) calls a reward-based TB: people 
earn time credits from a sponsoring organization that 
may be a charity or a public service organization. The 
sponsoring organization defines the goals, activities 
and resources. TB users earn credits by helping oth-
er members and can spend these credits on rewards 
such as food banks and sports centers that also form 
part of this circle. Other variations could be found 
such as the Accorderie model that includes individual 
and collective exchanges such as community credit 
programs and members pooling their buying power 
together to negotiate directly with producers (Fare 
2012). In addition, some schemes allow the partici-
pation of for-profit organizations (Dittmer 2013).
In the US and UK, there is also often a paid 
time-broker facilitating exchanges and invigorating 
the TB. In this case, TBs depend on public funds. 
Furthermore, in the US and the UK TB person-to-per-
son exchanges are tax-exempt as they are consid-
ered as volunteerism (Dittmer 2013; Collom, Lasker 
and Kyriakou 2012), whereas in Sweden they are not 
(Molnar 2011). Therefore, a further consideration as 
regards the degree of support that TB may receive 
from the government, TBs are seen as schemes that 
encourage citizens’ active participation in line with 
the ´ Big Society´ notion (Halsall et al. 2014; Del Moral 
2013; North 2011).
method
The research adopted a method-mixed approach 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004), including a two-
phase data collection. First, a qualitative study of 
time brokers was carried out and second, a survey 
was distributed to members of TBs. Throughout the 
project, the researchers also followed the Facebook 
pages of four TBs, joined the Spanish Association for 
TB development and took part in two regional meet-
ings of TB managers.
In the first stage, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with time brokers of different TBs in Spain. 
The time brokers of our sample are not always em-
ployed unlike previous research in the US that shows 
that this is common in younger TBs (Collom, Lasker 
and Kyriakou 2012). Instead, some of the time bro-
kers were TB users that would receive their payment 
in time credits or would have rotating shifts. A total 
of 28 interviews were conducted representing 28 dif-
ferent TBs. This decision was taken for two reasons. 
First, it allowed establishing rapport with the TB man-
agers/time-brokers, the TB “gatekeepers” who fa-
cilitated the second phase of the fieldwork. In most 
cases, time brokers sent the questionnaire to the TB 
members and encouraged them to participate, while 
some forwarded it to other TBs with which they were 
in contact. Second, it allowed contextualizing the 
findings of the survey by understanding how TBs are 
managed.
For the selection of TBs, heterogeneous sampling 
was employed by identifying different characteristics 
to construct the sample (Patton 2002). Specifically, 
while most of the sample came from big cities such 
as Madrid or Barcelona, some TBs are located in 
smaller cities such as Girona and Tenerife or smaller 
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villages (e.g., Ribagorza). Most TBs in our sample 
(around 64%) were created in the last 5 years, while 
the oldest was created in 2003. In terms of member-
ship, very different cases were included; from TBs 
with 4000 members to others with 10 members. At 
the time of writing the paper, two of the TBs in our 
sample have closed down (TB4, TB9); both originat-
ing from the 15M movement. Table 1 provides a de-
scription of TBs in terms of their characteristics.
To carry out the interviews with TB managers, a 
topic guide was developed to allow for more sponta-
neity and flexibility in information gathering; this guide 
became more detailed as the fieldwork proceeded. 
This was also necessary to ensure consistency as 
the interviews were carried out simultaneously by two 
different researchers. Interviews lasted from 30 min-
utes to one hour and took place during the months of 
January, February and March 2013.
In the second phase, self-administered ques-
tionnaires were sent to TB members, principally 
by email (via time brokers, TB Facebook pages 
and on the webpage of the Association for TB de-
velopment). Targeting TB users via email was sug-
gested by TB managers since it was usually the 
habitual means of communicating with members. 
Questionnaires were distributed during a meeting of 
the TB in only one case.
A total of 295 questionnaires were returned, 
of which 270 were valid. There are no studies that 
have quantified or described the universe (users of 
TB) with certainty. According to rough estimates by 
Boyle (2014), TB users in Europe may reach up to 
200,000 members, whereas information provided by 
Julio Gisbert reveals 328 Spanish TBs but no specific 
information about the total number of users (Vivir Sin 
Empleo 2014).
Table 1. 
Description of time banks
TB City Year of 
creation
Number of 
users
Founders
TB1 Tenerife/ urban 2010 240* Neighbors 
TB2 Barcelona/ urban 2011 57 Town council and Salud y Familia Foundation (SFF)a
TB3 Barcelona/ urban 2011 59 Neighbor Association and SFF
TB4 Valencia/ rural 2012 20 Group of friends/15Mb
TB5 Barcelona/Urban 2006 200* Town council, SFF and ‘Women and Community’ Association
TB6 Barcelona/Urban 2011 152 Neighbor Association and SFF 
TB7 Valencia/Rural 2012 50 Town council and Women’s association (Casa de la dona)
TB8 Menorca/Urban 2009 250* Grassroots initiative, SFF and help from another TB
TB9 Mallorca/rural 2012 70 15M
TB10 Barcelona/Urban 2003 200* Neighbor Association
TB11 Barcelona/Urban 2007 83 Barcelona Activa
TB12 Barcelona/Urban 2012 30 Neighbor Association and SFF
TB13 Girona/Urban 2010 564 Neighbor Association and SFF
TB14 Barcelona/Urban 1999 300 Neighbor Association
TB15 Madrid/Urban 2009 80 Association Ida y Vuelta
TB16 Valladolid/Urban 2005 510 Town Council
TB17 Madrid/urban 2005 260 Neighbors
TB18 Valencia/Urban 2010 105 Neighbor Association
TB19 Madrid/urban 2011 105 15M
TB20 Online 2012 4000 Entrepreneurs
TB21 Huesca/rural 2011 10 Neighbors
TB22 Valencia/Urban 2005 250 Town council
TB23 Madrid/urban 2006 56 NGO Red Cross
TB24 Madrid/urban 2011 30 15M
TB25 Madrid/urban 2011 200 15M
TB26 Madrid/urban 2011 76 Neighbors
TB27 Madrid/urban 2005 1031 Town council
* The number is approximate as not all time brokers had strict control over the number of users.
a Salud y Familia is a private, not-for-profit association that provides consulting and guidance to new TBs in Spain (please see http://www.saludyfamilia.es/
ca/bancs-del-temps-cohesio-social/bancs-del-temps).
b These TBs originated from the 15M movement in Spain.
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Illusions: goals of TBs and description of users
All the TBs studied are person-to-person and 
work similarly to the type I TB, also coined as the 
babysitting circle, as specified by Boyle (2014). All 
the TBs use an egalitarian time-based measure of 
value: one hour equals to one hour regardless of the 
service. Services on offer and demand are fairly simi-
lar across TBs. However, contrary to Boyle (2014), 
who refers to Spanish TBs as homogeneous orga-
nizations, wide differences exist. To better account 
for these differences, a classification scheme or tax-
onomy is proposed, since this is a particularly useful 
tool in order to describe and structure a phenomenon 
about which little is known. Taxonomies organize 
“phenomena into mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
sets, with a series of discrete decision rules” (Dotty 
and Glick 1994). In the phenomenon under study, 
three decision rules are used to classify TB: (i) type 
of promoter; (ii) organization and functioning; and 
(iii) means of communication, since these emerge 
as the criteria that best capture differences among 
TBs (also see Del Moral 2013; Collom, Lasker and 
Kyriakou 2012; Seyfang and Pearson 2000). A sum-
mary of the decision rules and the corresponding 
schemes is found in Table 2.
According to the promoter, three types are identi-
fied. The promoter is key since it will shape the goals 
of the scheme and, to a large extent, its rules and 
procedures. In turn, as we will discuss later, the man-
agement (in particular, the existence of a time broker) 
will influence active participation. 
(1) TBs created by town councils. Management 
of these banks is either outsourced to a local for-
profit company (e.g., TB16 and TB22) or entrusted 
to social workers (e.g., TB21). These TBs are part 
of the Services to Families unit and are therefore 
closer to the vision of TBs as a tool to regain the 
work-life balance or to empower women. 
(2) TBs created by neighborhood associations 
or neighbors and within nonprofit organiza-
tions and other associations (e.g., TB17, 18 and 
26). The main aim of these banks was to create 
more and deeper social ties in the neighborhood 
by facilitating the creation of mutual support net-
works. Most TBs in the study started out as grass-
roots movements originating from neighborhood 
associations but some asked support from the local 
council. For example, the TB13 manager mentions:
According to the survey, the prototypical profile of 
their TB is a middle-aged woman with higher education 
(see Table 3 in Results). This confirms the information 
provided by TB managers in the interviews. Compared 
to the total Spanish population (according to Spanish 
Statistical Office data), women, the middle-aged, 
highly educated individuals and members of NGOs 
are overrepresented in the sample. A disadvantage of 
this sampling method is the risk of self-selection: it is 
likely that the most committed users will answer the 
questionnaire, and the inactive or uncommitted will be 
underrepresented. Although other sampling methods 
were considered (e.g., handing out the questionnaires 
during meetings, snowball sampling, etc.), according to 
the time brokers interviewed, the results were likely to 
be similar. In the sample, 20% of all respondents had 
never engaged in a TB exchange. This percentage is 
lower than the figure put forward by most TB manag-
ers (ranging from 40% to 80% depending on the TB). 
Therefore, it should be mentioned that the sample is 
likely to be biased towards the most active users.
Finally, the questionnaire included an initial six 
questions about engagement with the TB. Users 
were asked to report the month and year they joined 
the bank (tenure), the number of transactions carried 
out, the date of their last transaction and the services 
supplied and demanded.
Second, users were asked whether they engaged 
in other actions related to collaborative consump-
tion (such as swapping and local currencies), volun-
teerism, or political participation (e.g., participation in 
social or civic associations). Third, consumers were 
presented with a list of goals and asked to recall and 
report what goals they were pursuing when they 
joined the TB. A modified version of the Taxonomy 
of Human Goals (Ford and Nichols 1987) was used 
(see Table 4 in Results). 
results
This section presents the main findings of the study 
and is structured into two main subsections: illusions 
and delusions. First, a description of TB is provided 
(goals and management of TBs and profile of users) 
and compared to other TBs described in the litera-
ture. The second section critically evaluates the ar-
ticulation of TB in Spain, by explaining the main chal-
lenges found during the study.
Table 2.
Classification scheme of TBs in Spain
According to the promoter Town council Neighborhood association or Neighbors; 
NPO and other Associations
Local assemblies
According to the functioning Horizontal or decentralized Vertical or centralized
According to the means of communication Dominant online Dominant offline
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It was an initiative of this neighborhood. We have one of 
the highest rates of immigrants and traditionally some 
problems of racism. So, we decided to start the time 
bank and asked help from the local council, because 
there is a governmental program to reinforce education 
and coexistence in neighborhoods. 
This reveals that TBs may result from a mixed top-
down (legal or political framework for support of 
the initiatives by local authorities) and a bottom-up 
approach (as a grassroots movement) similarly to 
what has been observed among Italian banches 
del tempo (Del Moral, 2013). Also, depending on 
the neighborhood they may be more similar to the 
social inclusion model (e.g., TB13). A modified ver-
sion of TBs that fits here is the solidarity bank. It is 
a grassroots movement operating on the basis of 
volunteers, but with no restrictions on exchanges 
or obligation for reciprocity. Their slogan is “I help 
you, you help me” to better adapt to the existing 
needs of the members. They have also created 
support groups to deal with painful experiences 
such as the loss of beloved ones. However, a par-
adox is that although it is a grassroots movement, 
this solidarity bank has been awarded prizes by 
local authorities for their humanitarian work and is 
recommended by public social services that lack 
resources to deal with all the cases they receive, 
especially those related to child and elderly care. 
Thus, the solidarity bank currently complements 
or even substitutes the existing social care system 
(Clary 2008).
A subversion of this type are TBs created within 
nonprofit organizations (e.g., TB15 and 23) similar 
to those described by Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 
(2012). Their primary aim is to improve the social 
fabric of local communities. In certain cases they 
may also be more selective. For example, TB7 was 
founded by a women’s association and would only 
accept women as TB members. 
(3) TBs created by local assemblies. These TB 
emerged after the 15M movement (e.g., TB4, TB9, 
TB24). While they share the aim of creating social 
capital, they have other goals such as experiment-
ing or putting into practice new economic relation-
ships not mediated by the markets or showing oth-
ers that there are exchange models other than the 
traditional capitalist market. As the TB4 manager 
argued though, they lacked any support from the 
local council to carry on with the TB and that consti-
tuted an important barrier for the TB growth along 
with issues of participants’ decreasing motivation.
The previous description suggests that there is a 
relationship between the promoter and the main goal 
assigned to the TB. For example, the goal is more 
political in TB born from assemblies, whereas it be-
comes more oriented towards the creation of social 
capital in TB stemming from neighborhood associa-
tions. Moreover, this categorization shows that time 
banking is not a homogenous project in Spain, but 
fragmented, given that many possible goals are at-
tached to the schemes. 
The second criterion for categorizing TBs relates 
to their organization and functioning; in particular, ac-
cording to the level of mediation of time brokers, two 
types of TB were found: the horizontal or decentral-
ized and the vertical or centralized type. In the verti-
cal TB, the time broker figure is prominent in differ-
ent stages of the transactions. Users explain their 
offers and demands to the TB broker and s/he acts 
as an intermediary by matching the demand and the 
offer. Specifically, the broker contacts both parties 
and gives them each other’s contact details leaving 
it to them to arrange an appointment. Otherwise, the 
parties will meet at the headquarters of the TB and 
arrange a future appointment. Afterwards, users will 
contact the time broker after the transaction to credit/
debit their time accounts.
In the horizontal TB, members do not need to 
contact directly with the TB to ask for a service. They 
usually receive an updated list of all the services of-
fered or check them directly in the online application 
(if the bank operates online), so they choose directly 
from the directory and contact the other party. In 
those cases, the time broker’s role is more focused 
upon other tasks (i.e., attracting and maintaining us-
ers, encouraging exchanges, organizing group ex-
changes). Nevertheless, hybrid variations can be 
found such as TBs that are horizontal, but the time 
broker may mediate transactions for older members 
that cannot use online directories or for members 
without Internet access. 
Other TBs have volunteer time brokers that are 
paid in time. In contrast, municipal TBs have a paid 
position for this role. The unpaid function of time 
broking translates into slower rhythms and efficiency, 
tiredness (and likely resignation) of the volunteers 
and, potentially, the dissatisfaction of members.
Since the final sample comprised both types of 
TB, the respective time brokers explained the advan-
tages and disadvantages of these approaches. In 
the case of vertical TBs, exchanges are mediated by 
the time broker who is in charge of selecting the best 
possible fit for each service requested according to 
the needs and idiosyncrasy of the requesting party. 
This increases trust among TB participants as well as 
the likelihood that the exchange will be successfully 
completed and evaluated. Other potential benefits 
of vertical TBs are that users avoid the “embarrass-
ment” and effort of having to “negotiate” with other 
members, especially strangers (Molnar 2011). 
Horizontal TBs are faster and more efficient. As 
the time broker of TB13 stated: “Two minutes and 
the problem is solved”. If exchanges are mediated by 
time brokers, then they are subject to their availability 
and the TB office hours. However, we found that in 
horizontal TBs where TB brokers are almost nonex-
istent, there are fewer exchanges to the point of total 
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inactivity of the TB (e.g., TB19, TB21). TB13 is an 
exception as it is a very active horizontal TB whose 
brokers actively participate in keeping records of the 
TB’s activity, encouraging more exchanges, and so 
on, which reinforces the crucial role of time brokers 
as “exchange propellers”. 
Finally, according to the principal means of com-
munication, we distinguish between dominant online 
and dominant offline TB. There are two communi-
cation flows: between time brokers and users and 
among users. In many TBs, time brokers send e-
mails to the users with news about the TB, updated 
lists of the services offered and upcoming events. 
Other TBs, such as TB1, have forums. Many TBs 
also have a Facebook page where all members can 
interact. Members may post a need they have, time 
brokers inform members about new services and up-
coming events or pictures and comments on previ-
ous events. However, this depends on the profile of 
the participants. For example, most participants in 
TB3 are older and not keen on information technolo-
gy, so communication through e-mails was ruled out. 
Instead, they prefer communicating offline with meet-
ings at their office or by sending printed newsletters. 
It is straightforward that online TBs hold a greater 
potential of being horizontal. Moreover, the manage-
ment of the TB varies, encompassing online and of-
fline elements and devices; from handwriting credited 
and debited time accounts and using checkbooks to 
online software and online time accounts. 
The majority of TBs in our sample organize meet-
ings on a frequent basis. TB6, for example, meets 
once a month to discuss the project, while other TBs 
organize group exchanges such as yoga or English 
classes. These activities and meetings are deemed 
crucial by TB managers, since they build trust and 
lead to further person-to-person exchanges. 
In this sense, the existence of a permanent physi-
cal space that acts as the TB office is also relevant 
with regards to how and where members communi-
cate. As previously mentioned, if TBs have some type 
of support from local town councils, they often have 
a designated space to hold their meetings, register 
members, or carry out group or individual exchanges, 
among others. For example, most TBs in Barcelona 
(e.g., TB2, 3, 5, 6) have an office within larger com-
munity centers and can use the space on specific 
day/s of week. Nevertheless, when this is not the 
case, the time brokers have to employ creative strate-
gies to find a space to meet and interact in person. 
In dominant online TBs (TB20) both communica-
tions and services take place online. The manager 
of the TB20 explained that they created a website 
to facilitate the personal trade of services since few 
transactions were carried out face-to-face: most peo-
ple prefer to exchange services online. Furthermore, 
purely online TBs do not restrict membership to spe-
cific neighborhoods, which has traditionally been 
a common criterion of exclusion for membership 
(Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 2012). These TBs are 
more similar to knowledge banks since the services 
exchanged are knowledge–based (e.g., professional 
advice, career coaching, translation services, among 
others). Surprisingly, the number of transactions car-
ried out and the total membership of this online TB 
was greater than other older TBs. This may be due 
to different reasons: the nature of the services ex-
changed requires less trust among participants; peo-
ple are more used to sharing on the Internet; or the 
transaction time (i.e., speed of the offer and demand 
match and service provision), which is clearly lower 
in online TB.
To sum up, TBs in Spain are rather fragmented. 
Although they share some common features (e.g., 
egalitarian value), they pursue different goals and are 
organized very differently. This description reinforces 
the idea of TBs as “chameleonic” devices that are 
instrumental for different purposes, albeit enhancing 
social capital is the dominant one. 
Regarding the profile of users, our survey shows 
that the average TB user is female, middle-aged has 
a university education and children. The feminization 
of TB has been reported in other studies and is not 
exclusive to Spain (Boyle 2014). Previous research 
has also found that women tend to predominate in 
community currencies because they give value to 
the informal, non-marketized work usually offered by 
women (Del Moral 2013; Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 
2012; Seyfang 2001). In their comparison of three 
US TBs, Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou (2012) found 
that members living alone represented 40 to 60% of 
members, which clearly does not apply here. The 
limited membership among the eldest (4%) and the 
segment with no schooling (6%) is significantly lower 
than other studies (Seyfang 2002; Collom 2008). In 
Seyfang and Smith (2002), for example, over 40% of 
participants are of retirement age. However, Collom, 
Lasker and Kyriakou (2012) argued that historical-
ly TB tended to attract the elderly because of their 
community building orientation, but they found that 
TB founded after 2009 had an underrepresentation 
of elderly in their membership. Dubois Schor and 
Carfagna (2014) also found younger members to be 
overrepresented. In our sample, 24.9% were unem-
ployed, which is roughly representative of the unem-
ployed Spanish population in recent years. This may 
suggest that TB do not contribute to the social inclu-
sion of the marginalized and unemployed. However, 
these results may be due to the fact that the survey 
was predominantly online. 
The majority of TB users do not appear to be 
households stricken by poverty, unemployment and 
vulnerability as in other types of community currencies 
that have grown in times of crisis like the Argentine 
Red de Trueque (Gomez and Helmsing 2008). Due 
to the economic situation in Spain, the percentage 
may have been expected to be significantly higher. 
Furthermore, TB brokers explicitly disagree with the 
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view of TBs as shelters and relief providers for the job-
less. TBs do not seem to contribute to local economic 
regeneration by providing a secondary source of in-
come for the poor and unemployed like the Argentine 
Red de Trueque (Gomez and Helmsing 2008). Time 
brokers disagree that unemployed members have in-
creased in recent years, arguing that the TB is not a 
place “where people can satisfy basic needs”; rather, 
they believe that the participation in TBs is a way to 
“stay busy” and boost self-esteem by exercising skills 
that are not otherwise offered. This result confirms 
previous framings of time banking as a social rather 
than an economic-utilitarian project (Seyfang and 
Longhurst 2013a; b) for the Spanish context.
One out of 10 respondents joined the TB before 
2008; 13% more until 2011 and the rest from 2011 
onwards. Six out of 10 are new members, since they 
have joined in the last two years (2012-2013). This 
is consistent with the growth of the TB phenomenon 
reported in the media. 
In relation to their lifestyle, a minority of the re-
spondents fit in with what can be labelled as com-
munity-engaged lifestyles, since they carry out other 
collaborative activities and do volunteer work. For 
example, 4 out of 10 users take part in other forms of 
sustainable consumption, such as swapping (40.5%) 
or second-hand buying (43.2%), but only a marginal 
10 percent participates in local currency schemes. 
Approximately 3 out of 10 do some form of volunteer 
work. Conventional political engagement (i.e., mem-
bership in political parties or trade unions) is also 
marginal (18%), while the percentage of those par-
ticipating in the local assembly movement is slightly 
higher (21%). This is not surprising given that some 
TBs have emerged from this movement.
Thus, the description of TB users suggests that 
TBs have successfully attracted citizens that are not 
volunteers elsewhere nor do they have an intense 
political orientation, as also found in Molnar (2011). 
Consistent with previous authors (Boyle 2014; 
Molnar 2011), TBs seem to attract the ‘mainstream’ 
social groups. Although TBs remain rather reform-
ist (Dittmer 2013), they have become a valid option 
for participation, empowerment and social capital 
creation for people who do not form part of other 
movements. 
Finally, regarding the motivational profile, the 
descriptive statistics show that the most common 
goals are integrative (i.e., belongingness, social 
responsibility, equality and resource provision, 
64%) followed by expressive goals (i.e., protesting 
against the system, setting an example, 48%), cog-
nitive goals (i.e., understanding and intellectual cre-
ativity, 42%) and subjective organization goals (i.e., 
unity and transcendence). ANOVA and t-tests do not 
reveal differences. 
In line with previous criticisms regarding the 
economic potential of TBs (Dittmer 2013; Lee et al. 
2004), obtaining a material gain is mentioned by 
only 44% of participants (to a larger extent by the 
unemployed, p-value <0.05). This shows that, for 
the majority of respondents, the principal motivation 
to join the TB is not economic although such dis-
courses have been constructed in international me-
dia in recent years. Instead, goals such as creating a 
community or protesting against the current system 
emerge as a more widespread response. Previously, 
Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou (2012) found that TB 
members were guided principally by practical, social 
and ideological considerations. 
Therefore, according to these results, partici-
pants seek to improve their relational capital, cultur-
al capital and, less importantly, their material capi-
tal (see Ozanne 2010) through their participation. 
Interestingly, their participation indeed holds an ex-
pressive function: protesting against the system or 
showing that a different economy is possible, even 
in cases where the TB was not initially created with 
a political dimension (emerging from the assembly 
movement). 
Hence, on the one hand participants join be-
cause they want to make a statement and express 
disagreement with the current status quo. On the 
other hand, the integrative goals mentioned by the 
participants shows the need for stronger communi-
ties that people can rely on and the desire to be 
altruistic. People join because they want to help, 
rather than being helped. These findings reflect the 
need to seek collective solutions to the dismantle-
ment of the welfare state in times of crisis, rather 
than simply a network where individuals can obtain 
free services. 
Table 3.
Description of respondents
Gender Men 31.7% Women 68.3%
Age 18-29 10.6% 30-49 58.7% 50-64 26.8% Over 65 3.9%
Education No studies 6% Primary 4.5% Secondary 6.2% Intermediate 17.5% University 71.2%
Type of household Alone 25.7% Couple with no children 
41.5%
Couple with children
23.4%
Alone with children
7%
Living with parents 
2.3%
Employment Employed 59.6% Unemployed 24.2% Student 3.9% Retired 9% Housewife 3.4%
Member NPO No 49% Yes 51% 
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Moreover, although citizens join TBs because 
they want to learn (cognitive goals are chosen by 
most participants), it does not seem that they are 
being used as a way to improve employability skills. 
The most frequent type of services offered and de-
manded (i.e, cooking lessons, crafts) suggest that 
members are trying to acquire other skills, not nec-
essarily those sought and rewarded in labor mar-
kets. This “recreational and experiential” feature of 
Spanish TBs suggests that the majority of services 
are not highly skilled (Dittmer 2013; Seyfang 2006), 
but it also shows what participants principally look for 
as other services are also available.
The findings also show that the motivations of TB 
users mirror the goals of TBs, with one difference: 
users report having cognitive goals that are not ac-
knowledged by time brokers when explaining the 
project in the interviews. 
Delusions
So far we have depicted TB as heterogeneous 
schemes of increasing popularity. They have attract-
ed mainstream users that see in TBs a kaleidoscopic 
project that combines political, social, and economic 
dimensions. 
However, this view of TBs contrasts with the limited 
activity being carried out within them. One fourth of re-
spondents have never engaged in a transaction in the 
TB; hence, they can be considered “inactive”. Three out 
of 10 reported having carried out a transaction more 
than one month before the survey. Half of respondents 
are “recent” users and made a transaction in the last 
month (12%), in the last two weeks (7%), in the last 
week (25%) or the day before the survey (6%). On aver-
age, respondents reported making 2.1 transactions (the 
maximum being 6) since they joined the TB. This mean 
figure hides important differences among respondents: 
35.5% report having made one or less transactions, 
while only 6% are frequent users, having made 5-6 
transactions since they joined the TB. No relationship is 
observed between lifestyle and engagement, nor does 
it seem to vary according to the demographic subtypes.
This marginal use of TBs for exchanges contrasts 
with the symbolic importance attached to time bank-
ing as a social and political project. Actually, the lack 
of exchanges is the reason why two of the TBs stud-
ied have officially closed down and another two keep 
their activity at a minimum. If users do not exchange 
services, the sustainability of the TB is jeopardized, 
and with it, the potential achievement of social and 
political goals. Interestingly, group exchanges are 
more popular than person-to-person exchanges.
Table 4.
Description of goals
Type of goals (% of individuals choosing at least one goal of this type) Focal goal %
Affective goals (62.8%)
Entertainment 47.1
Happiness 32.2
Physical well-being 27.3
Cognitive goals (77.7%)
Exploration 37.2
Understanding—gaining knowledge 62.8
Intellectual creativity 52.1
Positive self-evaluation 32.2
Subjective organizational goals (61.2%)
Unity 48.8
Transcendence 34.7
Self-assertive social relationship goals (43.8%)
Individuality—feeling unique 6.6
Self-determination 31.4
Superiority 10.7
Resource acquisition—obtaining approval 7.4
Integrative social relationship goals (95.1%)
Belongingness 59.5
Social responsibility 60.3
Equality 56.2
Resource provision 77.7
Task goals (71.1%)
Mastery 47.1
Task creativity 27.3
Management-maintaining order 29.8
Material Gain 46.3
Expressive (69.4%)
Protesting against system 55.4
Showing others to be responsible 43.8
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The remainder of this section discusses why this 
occurs and unveils the challenges of time banking in 
Spain: the supply and demand mismatch, the type of 
services on offer/demand, the inherent inflexibilities 
and inefficiencies of the model, and the users’ “psy-
chological barriers”, including reluctance to request 
services. 
As they stand, TBs face many limitations to be-
coming an alternative market. As the online survey 
shows and the TB managers acknowledge, there is 
a mismatch between offer and demand. Participants 
seem to demand pleasurable experiences and tech-
nical expertise (hedonistic and functional services). 
Indeed, the t-tests show that demand is significantly 
higher than the offer for computer assistance, mas-
sages, and other beauty-related services such as 
hairdressing (p-value < 0.05). In contrast, the t-tests 
show that participants tend to offer significantly more 
altruistic, caring services such as looking after oth-
ers (animals, elderly or children) (p-value < 0.05). 
Moreover, this portfolio of services questions the 
potential of TBs to become a sustainable alternative 
to conventional markets since the services offered, 
such as dog walking, vegan cooking lessons or knit-
ting classes, do not fulfill basic needs. As the TB4 
manager explained:
Some people justified not using the services because they 
say: “the bank does not pay my mortgage”. They see it 
as a complement in the consumer society we live in. [...] 
Some people just do not see it as a real alternative. 
The main reason given in the literature (Dittmer 
2013; Seyfang 2006; Lee et al. 2004) to explain this 
problem is that the valuation of work, one of the ba-
sic principles of time banking, makes users offer only 
those skills and services that will not be valued in the 
conventional market; skilled providers go to the con-
ventional market since they feel undervalued (Dittmer 
2013). Moreover, trying to “get something done” is a 
time-consuming, “inefficient” experience that demoti-
vates people who go to conventional markets for “ur-
gent” things. In line with Dubois, Schor and Carfagna 
(2014), consumer socialization in mainstream mar-
kets negatively affects TB exchanges in that TB us-
ers do not stop looking for the professional services 
they can find in these markets. The following quote 
(TB8) evidences this problem:
For instance, my mother is a member of the time bank 
and she cannot handsew, she needs someone to hand-
sew her trousers. But this means: she has to call us, 
then she has to give the information, we find the per-
son, they arrange when to meet, she brings him her 
trousers and then the other person does it for her. And 
in this case it is for free, but it is a slower process. And 
my mother has credit, like 5 hours, because she has 
participated doing different things. But she will probably 
just take the trousers to the shop and have it done for 
5-6 euros. The rhythm of society is fast. You probably 
prefer to pay the 6 euros and have it done now! And this 
is a problem that we have, everything is like fast food!
Hence, if they have to compromise on the qual-
ity, convenience and the speed of delivery in TB ex-
changes, they might just opt for the market. In the 
aforementioned quote, getting a service in the TB ap-
pears to be the slowest and most complicated choice 
and is thus ignored as an option because of its lower 
utility for the user. The evaluation of TB exchanges 
on that basis affects the long-term ongoing partici-
pation of users. Furthermore, most TB brokers are 
categorical and emphasize that TBs do not wish to 
harm in any way the self-employed and smaller firms 
that have suffered greatly during the crisis.
We have to keep an eye on that. We do not want to 
take other people’s, working people’s jobs. You can ask 
someone to come one day and pick up your children 
from kindergarten, but not every day. Because by do-
ing so you are replacing a person whose job is exactly 
this; taking care of children. Time banking should be 
sporadic exchanges. (TB6)
But beyond that, there are “psychological barri-
ers” (Ozanne 2010) that make users try paid services 
first. Some TB managers (e.g., TB15, TB19) suggest 
that the main problem is not that they do not have 
the services users are looking for, but that users do 
not even think of the TB as a potential space for find-
ing such services. The TB is not a salient option for 
users. This reinforces the role of time brokers as a 
constant reminder of TBs as a potential space for 
meeting needs. 
The most prominent “psychological barrier” is the 
reluctance to request services, which according to 
time brokers, is the main reason why exchanges do 
not occur. TBs attract many people that are willing to 
offer services and to help but do not request services 
in return. This is probably due to the fact that they 
do not feel in need or because they resort to profes-
sional providers when they are in need of a service. 
The roots of this reluctance to ask for help should be 
explored in future studies. 
conclusIon
This study provides a broad description of Spanish 
TBs on various levels: in terms of their design and 
functioning (organizational-meso level) and in terms 
of participants, their goals and engagement with the 
TB (micro level). Both dimensions are important in 
order to understand how the TB project is positioned 
in the current political and social context of Spain.
In terms of organization, a taxonomy of Spanish 
TBs is offered along three dimensions: according to 
the promoter, according to their functioning and ac-
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cording to their means of communication. The find-
ings show that TB are heterogeneous and their differ-
ences affect the way they operate and the potential 
continuance of the project. We have also brought at-
tention to TBs that emerged from the 15M movement 
as a response to the current social situation in Spain. 
The findings of this study show that Spanish TBs 
share some similarities with those in other countries, 
but retain specific features. For example, the agency 
model of TB is not found. Similarly to previous re-
search on TBs, our findings emphasize the social di-
mension of time banking in Spain: TBs are more ori-
ented towards social capital creation and specifically 
to improving the social fabric of the neighborhood. 
This is the dominant role of Spanish TBs: to provide a 
structure to develop social networks, build trust, and 
reinforce social ties. 
In line with the criticisms regarding the limited eco-
nomic potential of TBs (Dittmer 2013), the utilitarian 
view of time banking does not seem that prominent 
in Spain. Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou (2012) found 
that members of some TBs use them mainly for prac-
tical reasons to cover real needs. However, other au-
thors, such as Seyfang (2002) and Del Moral (2013), 
coincide with our findings: TBs are used partially to 
cover specific needs such as repairs, but not princi-
pally. The profile of the TB members in our study also 
confirms this. Moreover, this study contends that us-
ers do not see TBs as a source of use value for vari-
ous reasons, thus jeopardizing the social and political 
value of the project. 
This seems to be a paradox: users join because 
they are attracted by the social and political dimen-
sion of the project, but unless TBs become a way 
of meeting users’ needs and solving problems, they 
will not fulfill their potential and ensure their continu-
ance. Here is where the delusion arises: the belief 
that TBs can continue to exist in their current form 
and that they are providing mutual support, when 
they are actually doing so in a very limited way. To 
some degree, our findings confirm previous claims 
that the majority of services are not highly skilled 
(Dittmer 2013), meaning that TB users have easy 
access to informal services such as babysitting or 
massages. Most importantly, however, we found 
that time banking is not a salient option for users 
who might opt for the market when they have a real 
need. This may happen either because they seek 
professional services or because TB exchanges 
involve a more complicated and time-consuming 
process. Furthermore, we found that many TB us-
ers offer their services but do not request any, thus 
violating the notion of reciprocity (see, for example, 
Collom, Lasker and Kyriakou 2012; Molnar 2011). 
This suggests that they may see TBs as spaces for 
volunteering where they can ‘provide’ their services 
guided by altruistic motives, but do not perceive 
themselves to be ‘in need’ or as potential recipients 
in TB exchanges. 
Time banking may be seen as another space for 
civic engagement that participants use to distance 
themselves from the market––understood not as a 
space for satisfying needs, but as the metonym of the 
neoliberal system and its values of competition, indi-
vidualism, selfishness, and so on. In line with other au-
thors (Forno and Graziano 2014; Castells, Caraca and 
Cardoso 2012), participants seem to look for meaning 
in different aspects of their daily lives. Thus, their par-
ticipation holds more of a symbolic significance rather 
than a functional utility: by joining a TB users may feel 
they are symbolically fighting the current neoliberal 
globalization, since TBs stand for “anti-neoliberal” val-
ues, such as care, inclusiveness or equality (Alberich 
2014). Nevertheless, such a view may be criticized 
since TBs can be promoted in line with the notion of 
the ‘Big Society’, but they place more responsibility on 
citizens and local communities while the welfare state 
is dismantled (Del Moral 2013; North 2011). 
Future research should explore the dynamic in-
terrelation of these spaces with other social actors 
such as other grassroots movements, peer pressure 
groups or local government authorities. A challenge 
is whether TBs are a passing fad or whether they will 
continue expanding in the near future. In that sense, 
it remains to be seen whether they are spaces of 
transition between social paradigms to a lesser or 
greater extent. 
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